McCain on Meet the Press (November 12, 2006)
Meet the Press offers an interesting format for ongoing debates involving public officials. Russert's great skill follows a basic formula. He addresses the questions on people's mind rather than throwing the softballs for sound bites that you get in many other places. Russert presents the basic question and listens closely to the initial response. That much, you can hear anywhere. Following that response, however, the debate really begins. Maintaining objectivity by treating all his political guests the same, Russert will follow up the initial position with a serious challenge. Usually, the challenge is the guests own statements, if they are at odds with the response just given, or the statements of others who, although not present, are still in the debate. Russert follows up until the guest says something clear about the conflict, and then he leaves it to the viewers to consider the response.
Keeping up with Meet the Press offers a good understanding of the political debates beyond the sound bites. Here, I will offer analysis of these Russert-constructed debates. As always, the best way to check this analysis is with your own read. You can always see the MTP transcripts at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id
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: McCain, 2008 Presidential Election, Meet the Press
Two central themes emerged in the McCain interview: 1. Given the Midterm results, isn't McCain's support for the war in Iraq a liability to his potential presidential campaign? And 2. Isn't McCain flip-flopping because of the demands of primary contests?
McCain made the following points regarding his position n Iraq:
- The midterm results are not accurately read as a rejection of the war, they simply show that people are frustrated with how the war is going.
- Military people agree that more troops are needed to be successful.
- People trust me on military issues because of my experiences (a non-specific reference to his POW experience).
- We should not quit. I don't want another embassy roof scene like we had n Saigon.
- We cannot stabilize and withdraw at the same time. Withdrawal emboldens the enemy and weakens the Iraqi Prime Minister.
- The Baker group will not produce a magic solution.
- The next few months will decide if we will win or lose.
- If the support for more troops is not there, then we should withdraw to honor the troops.
Analysis:
McCain seems to know he is in trouble on this issue. He is relying heavily on his military experience and his references to "most military people" to generate credibility for his support of more troops. This strategy also tacitly plays into the Vietnam-era explanation for the fall of Saigon. Namely that the reason the US ultimately lost in Vietnam was because the collapse of public support led politicians to tie the hands of the military men who simply needed more troops to be successful. He does not have to make this argument explicitly because it is well known to most in the primary audience he is courting. His own experience in the Hanoi Hilton also makes this implicit connection inescapable. In the end, his contention that the next few months will determine whether we will win or lose takes him off the hook for any clear proposal heading into the election season. The only way to disprove his argument is for the administration to increase troop levels now, and there is clearly very little support for that idea after last Tuesday. So, no matter what happens in the months ahead, McCain is covered argumentatively. Either we will win, in which case he will no longer have to answer these questions, or the situation will deteriorate, and he will be able to claim the failure is linked to the failure of the administration to increase troops like he and the military people wanted.
On the second issue of flip-flopping to position for the primaries, McCain has answers, but he is in a decidedly less strategic position. Russert approached this question from several angles. He referenced McCain's detente with Falwell, his condemnation of John Kerry's remark about Iraq, and his apparently new (pro-Iowan) position on ethanol. McCain definitely wants these issues to go away. He argues:
- Falwell came to me to ask for a new relationship.
- I only said ethanol did not make sense when oil was cheap. I changed my view when oil became expensive again.
- John Kerry's remark was reprehensible, but now that he apologized, the issue is over.
Analysis:
The implicit point in the Falwell observation is that he is not flip-flopping because he continued to see Falwell as "intolerant" until Falwell flip-flopped and came to him. Flimsy (that's a technical term for a poor argument that will probably work). On ethanol, Russert confronted McCain with his (McCain's) own press release issued when oil was $60/barrell saying that ethanol would increase gasoline prices for constituents. McCain simply denied having said it, and Russert allowed the subject to shift to whether McCain would skip the Iowa Caucuses as he did in his last presidential bid. McCain said that if he runs he will go to Iowa. On the Kerry remark, McCain is in the good position of taking the high ground (he apologized, so it is over now) while also reminding people how insulting the remark was to the troops. Remember, John Kerry may be an opponent of McCain's down the road, and McCain will be able to deploy this position over and over. However, even if Kerry is not an official opponent, running against him still plays well with the GOP primary audience who really still hate John Kerry from 2004. McCain can easily recall Swift Boat Veterans with this line of argument.
So, most of the arguments in this debate are couched in some implicit context that make them even more powerful than they appear on the surface. McCain closed with a strong appeal for ethics, earmarking, and lobbying reform. These are strong McCain positions, and they respond to the Midterm exit polls showing corruption as the biggest concern for voters in many places.
